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Comments
THE RIGHT OF FEDERAL OFFICERS TO REMOVE
GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED
TO SUPPORT CHILD SUPPORT DECREES
Since 1815 federal officers have had the right to remove suits against
them from state court to federal court when the acts forming the basis of the
cause of action were performed under color of federal office.' This grant of
federal jurisdiction rests upon the federal interest in protecting the exercise
of federal authority from state interference. It is designed to ensure the
enforcement of federal law by protecting federal officers against attempts by
state courts to impose liability or penalty upon the officers for performing
their official duties.2 The adjudication of a federal officer's defense of official
immunity is obviously an important function of the federal court.3 Despite
the strong federal interests in removal, a state's interest in enforcing its
laws has been recognized and accorded weight by some federal courts in
their determination of the removability of a suit under the federal officer
removal statute.4
Efforts by federal officers to invoke the present federal officer removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, in a unique context under the 1974 amendments to
the Social Security Act5 demonstrate the importance of carefully considering
1. See note 15 and accompanying text infra. The right to remove a suit from
state court to federal court is statutory. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 148 (3d ed. 1976). Under the general removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1976), a defendant may remove only those civil actions over which the
federal court has original jurisdiction. See generally 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.156 to .163 (2d ed. 1974); C. WRIGHT, supra at 148-59 (3d ed. 1976). Where removal is
sought by a federal officer, however, the applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976),
does not require that the cause of action lie within the original jurisdiction of the
federal court. Section 1442(a)(1) is set forth at note 14 infra. This Comment will
discuss only § 1442(a)(1). For a discussion of the evolution of officer removal, see text
accompanying notes 15 to 26 infra.
2. E.g., text accompanying notes 35 & 39 to 42 infra.
3. E.g., text accompanying notes 101 to 106 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 72 to 74 & 90 infra.
5. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat.
2337 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 to 660 (1976)).
In recent years the number of recipients of welfare assistance under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) has dramatically increased. This
increase has been caused largely by the nonsupport of families by absent parents.
When unable to enforce support obligations against the defaulting spouse, the
remaining spouse is often forced to seek welfare assistance. The Senate Committee on
Finance, reporting on the 1974 Amendments to the Social Security Act, cited statistics
indicating that 4 out of 5 recipients of AFDC monies are on the welfare rolls due to
nonsupport by an absent parent. The Committee noted further that in a 61/2-year
period families with absent fathers contributed approximately 4.8 million additional
recipients of AFDC benefits. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SOCIAL SERVICES
AMENDMENTS OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, 42-44, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8133, 8145-48. Recognizing the detrimental
effects nonsupport of children has upon both the family and the national economy,
Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide a comprehensive federal-state
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whether the federal interests underlying federal officer removal are present
in a proceeding sought to be removed. In section 459 of the amendments
Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States to garnish-
ment proceedings in which a spouse seeks to enforce support obligations by
garnishing federal monies due the defaulting spouse. 6 Although this waiver
of immunity made the United States amenable to suits in state court,
Congress did not concurrently provide the right to remove the state court
garnishment proceeding to federal court. 7 In most if not all section 459
proceedings, an officer of the United States will be the garnishee. Three
federal district courts have been presented with the issue whether the federal
child support program. For an analysis of the 1974 Social Services Amendments, see
Note, Federal Law and the Enforcement of Child Support Orders: A Critical Look at
Subchapter 4 Part D of the Social Services Amendments of 1974, 6 N.Y.U. REV. LAW &
Soc. CHANGE 23 (1976). For a general discussion of the problems caused by the
nonsupport of children by absent parents, see M. WINSTON & T. FoRSCHER,
NONSUPPORT OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BY AFFLUENT FATHERS AS A CAUSE OF
POVERTY AND WELFARE DEPENDENCE (1971); Foster, Dependent Children and the
Law, 18 U. PITr. L. REV. 579 (1957).
6. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 459, 88 Stat. 2337
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976)). 42 U.S.C. § 659 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975,
moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employ-
ment) due from, or payable by, the United States (including any agency or
instrumentality thereof and any wholly owned Federal corporation) to any
individual, including members of the armed services, shall be subject, in like
manner and to the same extent as if the United States were a private person,
to legal process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his
legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments.
For a discussion of the legislative history of § 459, see notes 128 to 130 and text
accompanying notes 128 to 132 infra.
Although § 459 does not expressly state that the United States is subject to
garnishment, the courts that have been presented with a garnishment proceeding
under § 459 have found that the words "legal process" in § 459 include a garnishment
action. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 164
(S.D. Tex. 1976) (mem. and order); Popple v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1227, 1228
(W.D.N.Y. 1976); Samples v. Samples, 414 F. Supp. 773, 773 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (mem.);
Golightly v. Golightly, 410 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D. Neb. 1976) (mem. and order);
Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315, 317 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (order of dismissal);
Bolling v. Howland, 398 F. Supp. 1313, 1313 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (mem.).
The waiver of sovereign immunity effects another important change in
existing law: Social Security benefits can be garnished. See SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, SOCIAL SERVICES AMENDMENTS OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8133, 8157.
7. A federal court may, however, assume original jurisdiction of a § 459
proceeding in the instance where the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
certifies that a state court is unable to enforce its support order. 42 U.S.C. § 660 (1976)
provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to any amount in controversy, to hear and determine any civil action
certified by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under section
652(a)(8) of this title. A civil action under this section may be brought in any
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disbursement officer can remove the proceeding to federal court under
section 1442(a)(1).8 Two courts denied removal, finding that no federal
interest was served by allowing a federal officer to remove a section 459
judicial district in which the claim arose, the plaintiff resides, or the
defendant resides.
Section 652 states in pertinent part:
(a) The Secretary shall establish, within the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare a separate organizational unit, under the direction of
a designee of the Secretary • . .who shall-
(8) receive applications from States for permission to utilize the courts
of the United States to enforce court orders for support against absent parents
and, upon a finding that (A) another State has not undertaken to enforce the
court order of the originating State against the absent parent within a
reasonable time, and (B) that utilization of the Federal courts is the only
reasonable method of enforcing such order, approve such applications....
Cases in which § 660 has been discussed include Williams v. Williams, 427 F. Supp.
557, 564-65 (D. Md. 1976); Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp.
162, 164 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (mem. and order granting remand motion); Golightly v.
Golightly, 410 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D. Neb. 1976) (mem. and order); Morrison v.
Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315, 317 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (order of dismissal); Bolling v.
Howland, 398 F. Supp. 1313, 1314-16 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (mem.). See also note 131
infra.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1976). Compare Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air
Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (mem. and order of remand) (no
federal interest present) and West v. West, 402 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(order of remand) (no personal liability of officer; no penalty for past official acts nor
restraint of future acts) with Williams v. Williams, 427 F. Supp. 557, 567 (D. Md. 1976)
(removal consistent with purposes of § 1442). For an analysis of these cases, see text
accompanying notes 135 to 184 infra. This issue was also discussed in Golightly v.
Golightly, 410 F. Supp. 861, 862 n.2 (D. Neb. 1976) (dictum) (mem. and order of
remand) (not against federal officer for official acts; United States cannot remove).
Several courts have. also considered whether a § 459 garnishment proceeding
can be removed to federal court under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1976). Section 1441 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded upon a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.
As indicated in note 1 supra, removal of a suit under § 1441 is proper only upon a
finding by the federal court that it has original jurisdiction of the cause of action. In
the cases in which the United States or its agency sought removal under § 1441,
jurisdiction was claimed under that section in combination with either 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976) or 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976). Section 1346(a)(2) provides: "(a) The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of:
... (2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
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proceeding. 9 Both of these courts concluded that the proceeding is not one
that threatens a federal officer with liability or penalty; 10 one of them
further observed that to allow removal of these garnishment proceedings
would effect a profound alteration in the relationship between state and
federal courts by bringing into the federal courts suits over which the state
courts have traditionally exercised exclusive jurisdiction." The third court
allowed removal of a section 459 proceeding under section 1442(a)(1),
apparently finding some federal interest warranting removal. 12
This Comment considers whether any federal interest justifies allowing
a federal officer to remove a section 459 proceeding under section 1442(a)(1),
the current federal officer removal statute. First, it traces the legislative
history of the right of removal. Next, it discusses the cases in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has stated the purposes of the federal
officer removal statutes and indicated the interests to be weighed in
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department ...." Section 1331(a) provides that "[tihe
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The courts have
held that a § 459 proceeding cannot be removed under § 1441 in combination with
either § 1331(a) or § 1346(a)(2) because the cause of action does not arise under any
federal law, within the meaning of § 1331(a), and is not founded upon the
Constitution, or any act of Congress, or any regulation of the executive department,
within the meaning of § 1346(a)(2). Because a § 459 action is not within the original
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it cannot be removed under § 1441.
The courts have explained that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 459 merely
removed the immunity of the United States to garnishment proceedings instituted to
enforce support orders, and that it did not create a federal right of garnishment. Thus,
the right of garnishment involved in a § 459 proceeding is created by state statute,
and the cause of action neither arises under federal law nor is founded upon the
Constitution, an act of Congress, or regulation of the executive department. Williams
v. Williams, 427 F. Supp. 557, 558-60 (D. Md. 1976) (§§ 1331(a) and 1346(2)(a)); Wilhelm
v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 164 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (mem. and
order of remand) (§§ 1346(a)(2) and 1331(a)); Popple v. United States, 416 F. Supp.
1227, 1228 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (by implication); Golightly v. Golightly, 410 F. Supp. 861,
862-63 (D. Neb. 1976) (mem. and order of remand) (§ 1346(a)(2)); Morrison v. Morrison,
408 F. Supp. 315, 317-18 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (§§ 1346(a)(2) and 1331(a)); West v. West, 402
F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (order of remand) (§ 1346(a)(2)); Bolling v.
Howland, 398 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (§ 1346(a)(2)).
It is possible, however, that there is a split in the federal district courts on the
removability of a § 459 proceeding under § 1441; two courts have allowed removal
without stating the statutory basis of their decision. See Crane v. Crane, 417 F. Supp.
38, 39 & n.2 (E.D. Okla. 1976) (dictum) (order of dismissal) (only garnishment
proceeding removable); Samples v. Samples, 414 F. Supp. 773, 773 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(mem.) (no discussion of removal).
9. Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (S.D.
Tex. 1976) (mem. and order of remand); West v. West, 402 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (N.D.
Ga. 1975) (order of remand).
10. See text accompanying notes 139 to 145 & 149 to 151 infra.
11. See note 139 and accompanying text infra.
12. Williams v. Williams, 427 F. Supp. 557, 567 (D. Md. 1976).
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construing them. The legislative history of section 459 of the 1974 Social
Security amendments is examined to determine the purpose of the waiver of
the sovereign immunity of the United States 13 and whether removal of a
section 459 proceeding by a federal officer was contemplated by Congress.
Finally, it analyzes the two cases in which federal officer removal of a
section 459 proceeding was denied and the one case in which it was granted,
and concludes with the recommendation that removal under section
1442(a)(1) be denied federal officers, agencies, and the United States itself
because there is no significant federal interest protected by federal officer
removal of a section 459 proceeding.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL
The present federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, provides in
pertinent part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State
court against any of the following persons may be removed by them to
the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or
person acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on
account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of
Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the
collection of the revenue.
14
Federal officers were first granted the right to remove suits against
them in an 1815 customs statute which provided that federal officers
engaged in its enforcement could remove to the federal courts any suit or
prosecution based upon the officers' acting under color of the statute. 5 This
removal provision was designed to protect federal officers enforcing a trade
embargo against England from interference by the New England states,
which had opposed the War of 1812.16 This statute, by its own terms, expired
at the end of the war.'7 A later provision, enacted in 1833, authorized the
13. This Comment does not discuss a separate but related issue, whether by
waiver of federal sovereign immunity, state garnishment law has been incorporated
into federal law, thereby creating a federal common law of garnishment.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1976).
15. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198. The Act provided in part:
[I]f any suit or prosecution be commenced in any state court, against any
collector, naval officer, surveyor, inspector, or any other officer, civil or
military, or any other person aiding or assisting, agreeable to the provisions
of this act, or under colour thereof, for anything done, or omitted to be done,
as an officer of the customs, or for anything done by virtue of this act or under
colour thereof, . . . the defendant shall . . .file a petition for the removal of
the cause . . .at the next circuit court of the United States ....
16. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969).
17. The Act provided that: "This act shall continue in force during the
continuance of the present war between the United States and Great Britain, and no
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removal of state suits or prosecutions against federal officers arising from
the officers' enforcement of customs laws.18 Its purpose was to prevent states
from penalizing federal officers for collecting duties under federal tariff
laws. 19 A still later provision, enacted by Congress during the war between
the states for the period of rebellion only, allowed the removal of suits
against federal officers which arose from their efforts to suppress the
rebellion of the southern states.2° Subsequent enactments extended the right
of removal to internal revenue officers, 21 officers of Congress, 22 officers of
the federal courts,23 members of the military services,2 4 and those engaged in
longer." Act of Feb. 4,1815, ch. 31, § 13, 3 Stat. 195, 200. This act was the first removal
provision but it never had effect; the War of 1812, unbeknown to Congress, had
terminated before its passage. The Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, §§ 6, 8, 3 Stat. 231,
233-35, contained the same language as the prior act and continued it for one year. It
was extended for an additional year by the Act of Apr. 27, 1816, ch. 110, §3, 3 Stat.
315. And the Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 109 § 2, 3 Stat. 395, which expired in 1821,
provided a similar removal right. See generally Strayhorn, The Immunity of Federal
Officers From State Prosecutions, 6 N.C.L. REV. 123, 129-32 (1928) (citing Warren,
Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. REV. 545, 584-85 (1925).
18. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 633. The act provided, inter alia:
That in any case where suit or prosecution shall be commenced in a court
of any state, against any officer of the United States, or other person, for or on
account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under
colour thereof, or for or on account of any right, authority, or title, set up or
claimed by such officer, or other person under any such law of the United
States, it shall be lawful for the defendant in such suit or prosecution ... [to]
petition to the circuit court of the United States ....
The act referred to revenue laws, but laws for the collection of internal
revenue did not exist in 1833. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Assessors v.
Osbornes, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 567, 573 (1869), treated the act as limited to cases
involving import duties. See H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1148 (1953).
19. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-06 (1968); Maryland v. Soper
(No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 268 (1879).
20. The Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, authorized the removal of
state prosecutions based upon acts of any government official who was carrying out
the suppression of the rebellion of the southern states. The act was amended by the
Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46 and the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
The 1863 act was later extended to cases arising under the Civil Rights Law, by the
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, and under the Freedman's Act, by the Act of
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. The Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140,
provided for the enforcement of the two preceding acts.
21. Act of Mar. 7, 1864, ch. 20, § 9, 13 Stat. 14, as amended by Act of June 30, 1864,
ch. 173, § 50, 13 Stat. 223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1976)).
22. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 130, § 8, 18 Stat. 371, and Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 1, 62 Stat. 909 (codified at both 2 U.S.C. § 118 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(4)
(1976)).
23. Act of Aug. 23, 1916, ch. 399, 39 Stat. 532 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3)
(1976)).
24. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, §3, Article of War 117, 39 Stat. 619. See Act of
June 4, 1920, art. 117, Articles of War, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat. 811, as amended




enforcing the National Prohibition Act. 25 Finally, in 1948, as part of the
general revision of the judicial code, Congress gave all federal officers this
right.26
The early removal statutes were enacted during periods of state hostility
to federal policies. The legislative history of these statutes indicates that
states frequently attempted to nullify federal laws by authorizing civil or
criminal actions against federal officers for their execution of federal laws.
Congress responded by providing for the removal of these suits to federal
court. 27 It seems clear that the right of removal is designed to protect the
federal government from attempts to interpose state policies where federal
authority has been exercised and is paramount. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has consistently characterized federal officer removal as an essential means
of preserving the supremacy of the federal government.
In Tennessee v. Davis,28 the defendant was a deputy collector of the
internal revenue whose official duties included seizing illicit distilleries.
While so doing he was assaulted and fired upon by several men. He returned
fire, killing one of the men. Despite the fact that the officer had been
enforcing a federal law at the time the death occurred, he was indicted under
Tennessee law for murder.29 The officer sought removal of the pending state
murder prosecution to federal court,30 claiming that he had acted by right of
his office and in self-defense. 31 The case was removed to federal court,32 and
the state moved that the trial be remanded to state court. The federal circuit
court judges disagreed as to whether this motion should be granted and
certified three questions to the United States Supreme Court.
33
25. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, § 28, 41 Stat. 305, repealed by Act of Aug. 27,
1935, ch. 740, tit. I, § 1, 49 Stat. 872 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)).
26. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976)).
27. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-06 (1969); Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 268 (1879).
28. 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257 (1879).
29. Id. at 260-61.
30. The officer claimed a right of removal under REV. STAT. 643 (1875).
31. 100 U.S. (10 Otto) at 260-61.
32. Nothing explicitly states that the case was in fact removed, but removal can
be inferred from the fact that the circuit court was faced with a motion by the state to
remand the case to state court. See 100 U.S. (10 Otto) at 259-60.
33. Three questions were certified:
Whether an indictment of a revenue officer (of the United States) for
murder, found in a State court, under the facts alleged in the petition for
removal in this case, is removable to the Circuit Court of the United States,
under sect. 643 of the Revised Statutes.
Whether, if removable from the State court, there is any mode and
manner of procedure in the trial prescribed by the act of Congress.
Whether, if not, a trial of the guilt or innocence of the defendant can be
had in the United States Circuit Court.
100 U.S. (10 Otto) at 260.
As discussed in the text accompanying notes 35 to 37 infra, the Court
concluded that the prosecution was in fact removable. It did not explicitly answer the
second question, stating that the general powers of a circuit court were adequate for it
78519781
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that the officer's
allegations made out a case for removal if the removal statute upon which
he relied encompassed criminal prosecutions and if such a removal statute
was constitutional. 34 In construing the statute to cover the case the Court
stated:
The act of Congress authorizes the removal of any cause, when the acts
of the defendant complained of were done, or claimed to have been done,
in the discharge of his duty as a Federal officer. It makes such a claim a
basis for the assumption of Federal jurisdiction of the case, and for
retaining it, at least until the claim proves unfounded.35
Having stated this statutory purpose, Justice Strong found it "too plain to
admit of denial" that the statute permitted removal of 3 6 criminal actions
filed in state court against federal officers. He pointed out that the language
of the statute encompassed state criminal prosecutions, and emphasized
that to construe the statute so as to preclude removal of prosecutions under
state law would render this language meaningless.37
Having found the removal statute applicable to the case before the
Court, Justice Strong went on to examine the constitutionality of the statute.
The issue was whether the Constitution conferred upon Congress the power
to authorize the removal of a state prosecution of a federal revenue officer
where it appeared that the case raised a federal question or a claim to a
federal right.3S8 Justice Strong identified the federal interest involved in
removal as the preservation of the ability of the federal government to
protect itself in the exercise of its constitutional powers, an ability he
to meet any problems that could occur in the trying of the case. The Court answered
the third question in the affirmative, indicating that its reasons had been adequately
stated in its answer to the second question. Id. at 271-72.
The Court did not indicate the basis for the circuit court's certification of these
questions or the reason the Supreme Court heard them. Apparently the procedure
followed was that mandated by REV. STAT. §§ 651 & 697 (1875), whereby either party
in a criminal proceeding in which the circuit judges were divided in opinion could
request the judges to certify the questions upon which they were divided to the
Supreme Court. REV. STAT. 651 (1875). The circuit judges were then required to certify
such questions, id., and the Supreme Court, in turn, was required to decide these
issues, REV. STAT. 697 (1875).
The Revised Statutes indicate that this procedure was derived from the Act of
Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 159, a certification procedure encompassing both civil
and criminal cases.
34. 100 U.S. (10 Otto) at 261.
35. Id. at 261-62.
36. Id. at 262.
37. Id. The Court pointed out that state courts have no authority to try offenses
against the United States. Thus, any attempt to construe the reference in the removal
statute to criminal prosecutions as a reference to removal of criminal prosecutions for





considered necessary for the survival of the national government. 39 Removal
serves this function by protecting officers carrying out constitutionally
authorized functions of the federal government:
[The federal government] can act only through its officers and agents,
and they must act within the States. If, when thus acting, and within
the scope of their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to
trial in State court, for an alleged offence against the law of the State,
yet warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the general
government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection, - if
their protection must be left to the action of the State court, - the
operations of the general government may at any time be arrested at the
will of one of its members. 40
The danger to federal authority in not allowing removal of such cases to
federal court, according to the Davis Court, is that states could paralyze the
federal government by enacting unfriendly legislation or by administering
state or federal law in a manner contrary to federal interests. 41
The Court ruled that the ability of the federal government to protect its
operations from state interference is guaranteed by its supremacy in those
areas in which it had been granted powers by the Constitution and
concluded that no state can exclude the federal government from exercising
authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, obstruct federal officers
against the will of the federal government, or withhold from the federal
government the cognizance of any subject committed to it by the
Constitution. 42 The Court thus determined that removal is a constitutional
mechanism for the protection of important federal interests, noting that
article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to make all
laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested in the
federal government by the Constitution. 43 It found the judicial power, a
power extending to all cases in law and equity arising under the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their
authority, among the powers granted to the federal government. 44 Quoting
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,45 the Davis Court stated that Congress
39. Id. at 262-63.




44. Id. at 264.
45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, the Court stated:
The question, then, is, whether the constitution of the United States has
provided a tribunal which can peacefully and rightfully protect those who are
employed in carrying into execution the laws of the Union, from the attempts
of a particular State to resist the execution of those laws.
It is not unusual for a legislative act to involve consequences which
are not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It
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can constitutionally grant federal courts jurisdiction over all cases in which
a question in which the judicial power of the United States is an ingredient
- whether the federal ingredient is stated expressly in terms of the
Constitution or federal law, or implicit in these sources of the judicial
power.46 The Court then pointed out that the general practice of removal had
been found constitutional, referring to the history of various removal
provisions,47 and rejected the argument that removal infringed upon state
sovereignty, noting that in entering the union the states had relinquished
their sovereignty in those areas where the authority of the federal
government was supreme. 48
Despite the Davis Court's emphasis on the interest of the federal
government in protecting its officers, later cases implicitly, and then
explicitly, construed officer removal statutes in a fashion that recognized
and protected the state interest in trying cases under state law, at least
where that interest was not in conflict with the federal interest protected by
removal. In Maryland v. Soper,49 for example, four prohibition agents and
their chauffeur sought to remove state criminal charges brought against
them, claiming that the charges related to the discharge of their duties as
federal officers. The men alleged that they were returning to their car after
investigating and destroying an illegal distillery when they discovered a
wounded man lying on the ground.51 They claimed to have taken the
wounded man to a doctor who pronounced him dead.52 After leaving the
body in a mortuary, the officers related their story to the local sheriff,
including the fact that they were acting as federal agents when they found
the body.5 3 The sheriff was not impressed; he arrested and jailed the men.5 4
Apparently, the state's attorney and grand jury were similarly unimpressed,
is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for
obeying this order. His security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual
thing, for an act of Congress to imply, without expressing, this very
exemption from State control .... The collectors of the revenue, the carriers
of the mail, the mint establishment, and all those institutions which are
public in their nature, are examples in point. It has never been doubted that
all who are employed in them, are protected while in the line of duty; and yet
this protection is not expressed in any act of Congress. It is incidental to, and
is implied in, the several acts by which these institutions are created, and is
secured in the individuals employed in them, by the judicial power alone; that
is, the judicial power is the instrument . . . [by which] . . . the government
* . . administer[s] this security.
Id. at 849, 865. See also The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 253 (1867).
46. 100 U.S. (10 Otto) at 264.
47. Id. at 265-71.
48. Id. at 266-67.
49. (No. 1) 270 U.S. 9 (1926).
50. Id. at 22-26.
51. Id. at 23-24.
52. Id. at 24.




for the officers were indicted for murder and for conspiring to obstruct
justice by lying at a subsequent inquest.55
Judge Soper allowed removal, denying the state's motion to quash the
removal petition.5 6 Rather than appeal this decision, the state applied to the
United States Supreme .Court for leave to file a petition for a writ of
mandamus5 7 The Court granted leave and issued a ruling against Judge
Soper to show why the writ should not issue5 8 Judge Soper responded that
the defendants had a right to remove the case because their acts were
performed under color of office in the course of enforcing the revenue and
prohibition laws of the United States,59 and the case was thus within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.60
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Soper's finding that the agents
were within the class protected by the removal statute,61 but nevertheless
refused to affirm Judge Soper's determination that the case was removable.
The Court first discussed the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus
directing a district judge to remand a removed case to state court. Chief
Justice Taft pointed out that mandamus was an extraordinary remedy
analagous to the intervention of equity to secure justice in the absence of
any other adequate remedy. 62 Despite the extraordinary nature of the writ,
the Chief Justice found that wresting from a state court the authority to try
offenses against its own state law, combined with the lack of any other
adequate remedy, was sufficient to allow the writ to issue where a federal
court has improperly granted removal of a state criminal proceeding. 63
The use of mandamus to guard the state's interest in trying cases
involving its own law provides the state with the opportunity to vindicate
this interest where it does not conflict with the federal interest protected by
removal. Although Chief Justice Taft never explicitly mentioned this state
interest in Soper, his opinion restricted removal in a fashion consistent with
a concern for state interests. He stated, for example, that although the
officer need not admit the commission of the act with which he is charged,
he must establish a causal connection between his actions and his official
duties.6 4 Indeed, the Court stated that the officer must exclude the possibility
that his conduct was not within the scope of his official duty.6 5 The officer's
defense must be personal immunity - his act must be justified by his duty
under federal law - and he must establish this defense fully and fairly by
55. Id. at 25-26.
56. Id. at 26.
57. Id. at 27.
58. Id.
59. Judge Soper noted--that the defendants need not admit having caused the
man's death in order to be allowed to remove. See id. at 28.
60. Id. at 27-28.
61. Id. at 30-33.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Id. at 29-30.
64. Id. at 33.
65. See id. at 35.
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the allegations in his petition before removal can be granted.6 6 The Court
ruled that the removal petition did not meet this requirement because it
alleged merely that the officers were carrying out their official duties when
they discovered the man.67 Chief Justice Taft stated that the defendants had
not been "candid, specific and positive in explaining . . . [their] relation to
the transaction out of which . . . [they] . . . were indicted, and in showing
that [their] relation to it was confined to [their] acts as . . . officer[s]. ' 6
Thus, the Court granted the writ but left open the possibility that the federal
judge could allow the officers to amend their petition for removal with
respect to the murder indictment.69 The Court also held, however, that the
obstruction of justice prosecution could not be removed, even if amended, for
the officers' testimony at the coroner's inquest - although arguably relating
to acts performed under color of federal office - was not itself given under
color of office. Because neither federal nor state law compelled the officers to
testify, their testimony was voluntary and therefore not even colorably in
performance of their duty as officers of the United States.
70
Detailed pleadings were required by the Soper opinion "so that the court
may be fully advised and the state may take issue by a motion to remand."' 7'
This requirement suggests a concern for the state interest in trying its own
criminal prosecutions in that it assures that the state will be provided with
the information necessary to contest removal. The state interest is protected
by requiring the defendant to declare his reasons for removal in such clear
terms that the state can challenge its validity and the court evaluate its
legitimacy. More than this, Soper's detailed pleadings requirement indicates
that where the federal interest is sufficiently remote the state interest may
preclude removal. The federal government arguably has an interest in
protecting all officers indicted for acts committed during their government
service because such an indictment at least raises the possibility of
interference with the functions of the federal government. Despite this, the
Court implicitly rejected such a broad interest as a justification for removal,
describing the rejected petition as inadequate because it alleged only facts
indicating that the act for which the officers were charged occurred when
they were performing their official duties.72 The limitation upon those
federal interests that justify officer removal is further illustrated by the
refusal of the Court to consider removing the obstruction of justice
prosecution. Although the Court in Soper frankly acknowledged that the
federal government would appear to have an interest in protecting its
officers from state actions directed against behavior related to the
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id. at 35.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 35-36.
70. Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36 (1926).
71. Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 34 (1926).
72. Id. at 35.
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performance of their offices, 73 it restricted removal to cases involving the
actual performance of official duties,74 thereby making the state interest in
prosecutions dominant against more remote federal interests.
The import of state interests in construing federal officer removal
statutes was more clearly stated in Colorado v. Symes. 75 In Symes a United
States prohibition officer charged by the state with murder was allowed to
remove the prosecution to federal court.76 The agent had alleged in his
petition to remove that, while investigating a restaurant for reported
violations of the National Prohibition Act, he saw a man take a bottle of
wine out of his pocket, place it on a counter, and look for a glass.77 When the
agent attempted to seize the bottle and arrest the man, he was resisted.78 A
fight ensued, requiring the officer to subdue the man by hitting him on the
head with his (the officer's) gun. 79 The man was subsequently arrested and
jailed.80 Although he appeared to be in good health, he died the following
day."' Alleging that the blow to the head had caused the death, the state
charged the agent with murder. 82 The officer successfully petitioned for
removal, 83 and Judge Symes denied the state's motion to remand the case to
state court, finding that the officer had met the requirements for removal
established by Soper.8 4 As in Soper, the state petitioned for leave to file in
the Supreme Court a motion for a rule requiring the judge to show cause why
a writ of mandamus should not issue to compel him to remand the case.
85
Leave was granted, and the motion filed and granted. 86 Judge Symes
responded to the show cause order, claiming that mandamus should not be
granted,8 7 but the Supreme Court was not persuaded.
Writing for the Court, Justice Butler began by restating the statutory
purpose for officer removal, as developed in Tennessee v. Davis, as the
protection of federal supremacy by safeguarding those acting under federal
authority from state punishment for violating state laws or policies that are
inconsistent with the federal laws or policies being vindicated by the federal
agent. 88 The Court stressed the importance of this purpose, stating that
73. Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36, 43-44 (1926).
74. Id. The Court indicated that the statute could not be so construed and that if
promoting this interest were considered desirable, Congress could do so by statute.
75. 286 U.S. 510 (1932).
76. Id. at 514.
77. Id. at 515-16.
78. Id. at 516.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 516-17.
82. See id. at 514.
83. Id.




88. Id. at 517-18.
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measures designed to protect this federal interest should be "liberally
construed to give full effect to the purposes for which they were enacted. '8 9
After noting the importance of this policy the Symes Court went on to
acknowledge the right of the states to make and enforce their own laws.
Although the federal government has the right to exert exclusive and
supreme power in the field constitutionally belonging to it, the Court
emphasized that "[t]he removal statute is to be construed with highest
regard" for the state's interest in making and enforcing its own laws:
Federal officers and employees are not, merely because they are such,
granted immunity from prosecution in state courts for crimes against
state law. Congress is not to be deemed to have intended that
jurisdiction to try persons accused of violating the laws of a state should
be wrested from its courts in the absence of a full disclosure of the facts
constituting the grounds on which they claim protection under section
33 [the removal statute].90
Having articulated the competing federal and state interests to be
considered in construing the removal statute, Justice Butler quoted the
removal requirements established in Soper.91 Applying these requirements
to the facts alleged in Symes, the Court ruled that the officer's petition did
not meet the Soper standard92 because, as in Soper, the officer's allegations
did not provide the Court with specific information sufficient to determine
the legitimacy of the officer's claim for removal.93
Except for its explicit recognition that both state and federal interests
should be considered in construing the removal statute, the Symes decision
added little to Soper. Willingham v. Morgan,94 the most recent Supreme
Court case addressing officer removal, appears to deviate from the Symes-
Soper position, for it construed the "color of office" requirement of the
current statute to require a far less detailed showing that the federal officer
seeking removal had acted within the scope of his official duty. 5 In
Willingham, the warden and chief medical officer of a federal penitentiary
were sued in state court by a prisoner for allegedly having innoculated the
prisoner with a foreign substance and for having beaten, tortured, and
assaulted him.96 The prison officers filed a petition for removal to the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that anything they
may have done to the prisoner had been done in the course of their duties as
federal officers and under color of their federal offices.9 7 The district court
89. Id.
90. Id. at 518.
91. Id. at 519-20.
92. Id. at 520.
93. Id. at 520-21.
94. 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
95. Id. at 408-09.




denied the prisoner's motion to remand the case to state court and proceeded
to grant summary judgment in favor of the officers on the theory that
recovery was barred by their official immunity.98 The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the record in the case insufficient to
support the district court's refusal to remand. 99 The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case to the appellate court
for a determination of the propriety of the grant of summary judgment and
any other questions remaining in the case.1 °
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall rejected the conclusion of the
court of appeals that the "color of office" test of section 1442(a)(1) provides a
limited basis for removal, stating that the test for removal should be broader
than the test for official immunity. 10 1 After tracing the history of officer
removal statutes,0 2 he quoted Tennessee v. Davis as stating the purpose of
federal officer removal. 10 3 Unlike Justice Butler in Symes, Justice Marshall
98. Id. at 404.
99. 383 F.2d 139, 142 (10th Cir. 1967).
100. 395 U.S. at 410.
101. Id. at 405. Although the Tenth Circuit found that the defendants fell within
the class protected by § 1442(a)(1), it held that the record did not show that the acts
complained of were committed under color of office. The court stated that § 1442
presents different standards for different classes of federal officers. 383 F.2d at 141,
and that the color of office test of § 1442(a)(1) provides a limited basis for removal. The
court cited several cases for the proposition that the color of office requirement is not
satisfied by a showing that the officer had been acting within the scope of his
employment (the standard for official immunity). Thus, although conceding that the
officers' statement that their only contact with the prisoner had occurred in the prison
might support a finding of immunity, the court found the statement insufficient to
support a finding that the officers had acted under color of office. 383 F.2d at 141-42.
The court concluded by expressing its regret that the standards for official immunity
and color of office differ, but explained that the difference is due to the fact that the
defense of official immunity is a common law doctrine that has been expanded by the
courts, and the test for removal is based upon a statute by whose language the courts
are bound. 383 F.2d at 142. The Tenth Circuit's narrow interpretation of § 1442(a)(1)
could have resulted in the defense of official immunity being adjudicated by a state
court, a result contrary to the purpose of federal officer removal.
102. 395 U.S. at 405-06. Justice Marshall initially noted that the first removal
provision, included in an 1815 customs statute, was part of an attempt to enforce a
trade embargo against Great Britain by protecting federal officers from interference
by hostile state courts, particularly in New England, where the War of 1812 was
unpopular. Id. at 405. Observing that "other periods of national stress spawned
similar enactments," he singled out two periods: South Carolina's threat of
nullification in 1833 and the Civil War. Id. Justice Marshall concluded by noting that
the present federal officer removal statute covers all federal officers. Id. at 406.
103. Id. at 406. Justice Marshall quoted the section of the Davis opinion at which
the Court explained that the operations of the national government could be halted if
the national government could not protect federal officers - the only means of
enforcing federal policy - from attempts by state courts to hold the officers civilly or
criminally liable for performing their official duties. See text accompanying note 40
supra. Justice Marshall added that "[f]ederal jurisdiction rests on a 'federal interest in
the matter,' the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal
officials." Id. (quoting Poss v. LAeberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir. 1962)).
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did not refer to a state's interest in trying cases under its own laws as
tempering the federal interest in removal. After enunciating the statutory
purpose of section 1442(a), he construed the statute's "under color" of federal
office requirement in light of that purpose, and found it at least "broad
enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense
arising out of their duty to enforce federal law."' 0 4 The Supreme Court stated
that, in contrast, the analysis of the Tenth Circuit would allow removal only
when the federal officer had a clearly sustainable defense sufficient to cause
the suit to be dismissed upon removal.'05 Because the Court felt that one of
the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense
of official immunity tried in a federal court, it concluded that a construction
of the "under color of. . . office" language that would require the defense to
be proved before removal would frustrate the purpose of the removal
statute.106
Having defined color of office, the Willingham Court proceeded to
determine whether the record in the case before it supported a finding that
the officers' conduct from which the prisoner's suit arose was under color of
office and therefore removable. In his motion to remand, the prisoner alleged
that the officers had been acting "'on a frolic of their own which had no
relevancy to their official duties.'-107 The officers' only response to this
allegation was that their only contact with the prisoner had been inside the
prison in the performance of their official duties.108 Thus, the issue before the
Court was whether allegations by the officers that their contact with the
prisoner had occurred while they were executing their official duties in the
penitentiary were sufficient to support removal under the statute.10 9
Justice Marshall initially noted the requirement of Soper and Symes
that "the person seeking the benefit of [the removal provisions] should be
candid, specific and positive in explaining his relation to the transaction
which gave rise to the suit.'"10 Instead of demanding the detailed allegations
those two cases required, however, Justice Marshall stated that the
requirements must be tailored to fit the peculiarities of each case."'
104. 395 U.S. at 406-07.
105. Id. at 407.
106. Id. Justice Marshall stated that the strong congressional policy of protecting
the exercise of all federal authority should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging
interpretation of § 1442(a)(1). Id. A corollary of the Court's position is that satisfaction
of the color of office requirement does not establish the defense of official immunity.
See, e.g., Green v. James, 473 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1973); North Carolina v. Carr, 386
F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967) (dictum).
107. 395 U.S. at 407.
108. Id. The Court noted that although the officers' allegations were in their
affidavits in support of their motion for summary judgment, whereas they should
have been in the officers' petition for removal, it was proper to treat the removal
petition as if it had been amended to include the information. Id. at n.3.





Examining the case at hand, he pointed out the dilemma of the federal
officers: Because the suit against them charged numerous wrongs on
numerous, unspecified dates, requiring the officers to be "candid, specific
and positive" regarding the suit's allegations would place them under the
impossible burden of describing every contact they or persons under their
supervision had ever had with the prisoner.1 2 By this analysis the Court
found it sufficient that the officers had shown that their relationship to the
prisoner had derived solely from their official duties. 113 Noting the
additional requirement of "color of office" that a "causal connection"
between the charged conduct and the asserted official authority exist,
Justice Marshall quoted Soper for the proposition that the requirement is
met if the basis of the state charge is the petitioners' acts or presence at a
place in performance of their official duties.'1 4 He found this requirement
satisfied by the fact that the officers were on duty at their place of federal
employment at all times relevant to the suit.1 15 The prisoner's allegation
that the officers were acting on their own was regarded as relevant to the
trial on the merits rather than to the appropriateness of removal. The
allegations were thus sufficient, and removal therefore proper." 6
Willingham appears to deemphasize the importance of a state's interest
in adjudicating offenses against its own laws by failing to mention this
interest as a factor to be considered in construing the removal statute. This
deemphasis is implicit in the statement of the Court that "color of office"
can be established by mere ability to raise a colorable defense arising from
the officer's duty to enforce federal law, and by the relaxed requirements
respecting the record that must be shown to support a finding that the
officer's conduct from which the suit arose was under color of office and
therefore removable." 7 A closer examination of the case, however, indicates
that Willingham is not truly irreconcilable with Soper and Symes, and that
the countervailing state interest against removal is still an important factor
to be considered, not only in construing the removal statute, but in
determining its application in a particular case.
The most obvious indication of the continuing importance of state
interest is found in footnote four of Willingham, where the Court stated:
"Were this a criminal case, a more detailed showing might be necessary
because of the more compelling state interest in conducting criminal trials in
the state courts."'"18 Although the footnote deals with the distinction between
criminal and civil cases, its reliance on the strong state interest in trying
criminal cases in state courts indicates that the showing required for
112. Id. at 408-09.
113. Id. at 409.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 409-10.
116. Id. at 407-08.
117. Id. at 408-09.
118. Id. at 409 n.4.
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removal should be greater in any case where the state interest in trying the
case is substantial in comparison to the federal interest in removal.11 9
The emphasis on the federal interest in Willingham becomes more
understandable when the Court's decision in that case is compared with the
Court's earlier decisions in Soper and Symes. In these earlier cases, the
Court seemed to equate the burden of proof necessary to support removal
with the burden which must be sustained to make out the defense of official
immunity.120 Willingham, in contrast, concluded that only a colorable
defense arising from the officers' federal duty need be shown. 121 The
placement of this lighter burden upon the federal officer might be
interpreted as a failure to consider the state's interest in enforcing its own
laws. The Willingham Court's analysis, however, indicates that considera-
tion of the state interest with respect to an officer's burden of proof would be
inappropriate in that it would thwart Congress' choice of removal as the
vehicle for vindicating the federal interest in protecting federal officers in
the performance of their official duties. If an officer were required to show
much more than the possibility that he may be able to establish a defense
arising from his federal duty, granting the removal petition would
necessarily result in dismissal of the suit. 122 Conversely, if the officer were
unable to establish his defense in his removal petition, the state court would
retain jurisdiction in derogation of the principle that federal officers be
permitted to present defenses of official immunity to a federal court.
Instead of emphasizing the detail necessary to establish that the
officers were acting under color of office, Justice Marshall ruled that they
need merely show that their relationship with the prisoner derived solely
from their official duties.'23 His reason for allowing such a vague showing,
however, distinguishes Willingham from Soper and Symes. In Soper and
Symes, the Court not only concluded that the officers were capable of
showing more detail, but apparently felt that a good faith petition for
removal would necessarily have included more detail.12 4 In Willingham, on
the other hand, Justice Marshall concluded that the nature of the suit
against the officers made it impossible for them to make more detailed
allegations. 125 In Soper and Symes both the federal and state interests could
be protected because, if the cases against the officers truly merited removal,
the officers would be able to allege these interests in detail. In Willingham
this capacity did not exist, and, unlike in Soper and Symes, the federal
interest in removal would be completely defeated by requiring the detailed
allegations necessary to protect the state interest in preventing removal.
When, as in Soper and Symes, the federal interest would not be impaired,
consideration of the state interest would still appear to be crucial.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 35 (1926).
121. 395 U.S. at 406-07.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 408-09.
124. See text accompanying notes 64 to 68 & 91 to 92 supra.
125. 395 U.S. at 409.
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Even if Willingham is interpreted as modifying Soper and Symes, the
very existence of the color of office requirement limits the federal interest
protected by removal and subordinates other federal interests to those of the
state. It might be argued that the interest of the federal government in
protecting its officers is unlimited and that any suit against an officer
potentially interferes with the performance of his duties. By requiring a
connection between an officer's performance of his duty and the facts upon
which the suit is based, the Court has limited the subordination of the state
interest in hearing cases based on its law in its own courts to cases where
the federal interest is stronger and more direct.
Although the Supreme Court appears so far to have limited the federal
interest only by way of construing the "under color of office" requirement,
another provision of the removal statute would seem to occasion a similar
consideration of the federal interest in removal of a suit. A federal court, in
deciding whether a state suit against a federal officer can be removed, not
only must carefully determine whether the officer acted under color of office,
but must also consider whether the suit is against the officer; that is, does
the action threaten the officer with personal liability or penalty? Yet, in the
many cases in which section 1442 has been construed, the federal courts
generally have not questioned whether the suit was in fact against the
officer himself.126 This is perhaps attributable to the fact that in the usual
case the federal officer is the named party defendant and to the assumption
that a lawsuit typically operates against the interests of the named
defendant.
The purposes of federal officer removal suggest that in order to be
"against" a federal officer, a suit must actually threaten him with personal
liability or penalty. Congress granted section 1442's right of federal officer
removal as a means of preventing states from subjecting federal officers to
civil or criminal liability for the performance of official duties.127 In a section
459 garnishment proceeding, the court should consider whether the suit
sought to be removed truly operates "against" the disbursing officer named
as a party. Section 459 makes the United States amenable to certain types of
garnishment proceedings, but garnishment is unusual in that it does not
normally impose liability or a penalty upon the disbursing officer as the
named party defendant.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 459 OF THE 1974
SOCIAL SERVICES AMENDMENTS
Until recently, the sovereign immunity of the United States to a
proceeding to which it had not consented precluded garnishing wages of
federal employees.128 Federal employees were often able to avoid paying
126. E.g., New Jersey v. Moriarity, 268 F. Supp. 546 (D.N.J. 1967).
127. See notes 102 to 103 supra.
128. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969); Maryland v. Soper (No. 1),




their child support and alimony obligations because the United States -
more specifically, the federal officer in charge of disbursing the defaulting
spouse's wages - could not be garnished to satisfy a state court's support
decree. Although at one time the pride and honor of government service may
have kept default on support obligations at a minimum, this is no longer the
case. 12 9 Responding to a dramatic increase in the number of welfare
recipients, caused in part by the nonsupport of children by absent parents,
Congress, in section 459 of the 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act,
waived the sovereign immunity of the United States to garnishment
proceedings instituted to enforce support obligations. 130 Section 459 does not
The courts had held that garnishment of remuneration due federal employees
would embarrass the national government, divert federal funds to extraneous
purposes, and interrupt the administration of the national government. Garnishment
of these monies was held to be against public policy. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Alexander,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 19 (1846) (seamen's wages); McGrew v. McGrew, 38 F.2d 541, 544
(D.C. Cir. 1930); Allen v. Allen, 291 F. Supp. 312, 314 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (monies due
doctor-husband from federal Medicare program); Applegate v. Applegate, 39 F. Supp.
887, 889-90 (E.D. Va. 1941) (naval officer's retirement benefits).
129. Senator Montoya, during debate on the Social Services Amendments of 1974,
stated:
This special privilege [immunity for federal employees] for one kind of
worker is partly a result of tradition and partly because it has not been
thought legally possible to sue the Federal Government as a "person" in order
to arrange for the garnishment of wages. For many years, the pride and honor
of Government service kept this kind of dishonorable behavior at a minimum.
Today, however, there are an increased number of men and women in military
and Government service - and a small percentage of "rotten apples" has
resulted in a growing number of families who have been left to fend for
themselves or to go on public welfare, with no recourse to the protection of the
courts or the law.
120 CONG. REC. 40339 (1974).
Representative Waggoner also remarked: "[W]e are simply placing these
people [federal employees] on a par to receive the same treatment and to assume the
same responsibilities that those who are employed in the private sector now have to
assume." 120 CONG. REC. 41810 (1974). See also S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
42, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8133, 8146-47.
130. For the text of § 459, see note 6 supra.
Congress was primarily concerned with reducing federal and state welfare
expenditures by ensuring adequate support collection mechanisms, one of which was
the waiver of United States sovereign immunity to a garnishment proceeding. Others
include a parent locator service, paternity establishment service, and access to the
federal courts in certain circumstances. See note 5 supra. The Senate Committee on
Finance in its report on the amendments noted that judicial enforcement of support
obligations is a serious problem that is partly attributable to the inactivity of judges,
prosecutors, and welfare officials, who either find such cases boring or are hostile to
the concept of a father's responsibility. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8133, 8147. See also M. WINSTON &
T. FORSCHER, NONSUPPORT OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN By AFFLUENT FATHERS AS A
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expressly confer the right to remove such garnishment proceedings 3 and
removal was referred to only briefly in that section's legislative history - in
the course of the following colloquy between Congressmen Eckhardt and
Ullman:
Mr. ECKHARDT. In Texas, we do not have garnishment of wages, so
this would be ingraining the Federal law on existing State law. Under
circumstances like that I would think the case would be removable to the
Federal court as a matter of right.
Is that what the gentleman feels would result? Can these cases all
be removed to Federal courts?
Mr. ULLMAN. No. The garnishment provision places the U.S.
Government in the same position as a private employer. Nonsupport
cases can be certified to the Federal courts only by the Secretary of HEW
who must find that use of the Federal courts is the only reasonable way
to enforce a court order. In the situation the gentleman cites, there would
be no court order on which to base such a finding.
Mr. ECKHARDT. But ordinarily, of course, the State court retains
jurisdiction of a divorce question. I just wonder what happens if we
remove that case to Federal court on Federal court jurisdiction bases.
Mr. Speaker, it seems to me we have a lot of very thorny conflict-in-
law questions here.
Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, as a matter of Federal law, this in no
way changes that situation at all. The existing law remains. They have
the right now and they would continue to have the right.
Mr. ECKHARDT. Then that would negate the provisions for removal
in this act?
Mr. ULLMAN. No, we do not affect that one way or the other.
Mr. ECKHARDT. Then we would not remove a divorce case to Federal
court with respect to this issue?
Mr. ULLMAN. We do not affect existing law in that regard at all.
Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I really do not understand the
answer.
132
CAUSE OF POVERTY AND WELFARE DEPENDENCE (1971); Foster, Dependent Children
and the Law, 18 U. PiTT. L. REV. 579, 610 (1957). The Committee further stated that it
hoped that implementation of the amendments would lower the welfare cost to the
taxpayer, deter a parent from abandoning his family, and spare children the pain of
family break-up. Its report added that the amendments are designed to help children
enjoy their right to financial support by their fathers. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 42, reprinted in [1974]IU.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 8146.
131. Only original jurisdiction of the federal courts is provided, and even this is
limited. See note 7 supra. See also 120 CONG. REC. 41809 (1974) where the enforcement
of § 459 was discussed:
Mr. KAZEN. Is the Federal Government going to be subject to State court
orders? How is it going to be enforced? Or is that mother of the children going
to have to go into Federal court?
Mr. ULLMAN. It is based on the State court order for child support. We
have provided that the Secretary can allow entry into the Federal courts in
some instances only when it cannot be properly taken care of under the State
court order.
132. 120 CONG. REC. 41810 (1974).
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Although this discussion is vague and to some extent ambiguous, it
suggests at least three conclusions with respect to the removability of
section 459 proceddings. First, Congressman Ullman emphasized that
section 459 puts the United States in the same position as a private
employer: one of being amenable to garnishment and of not being able to
remove under section 1442(a)(1). Second, he emphasized that the two classes
of suits - garnishment and domestic relations disputes - traditionally
have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts, and thought
that section 459's waiver of sovereign immunity would not remove them
from state control. Third, he believed that federal removal jurisdiction would
only be available where a state court is unable to enforce its support decree.
Thus although unclear, this interchange indicates that section 459 was
perceived, at least by Congressman Ullman, as making the United States
more amenable to suit in state courts, and that Congress perhaps envisioned
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over these suits only when a state court
could not enforce its orders.
THE FEDERAL COURTS' DIFFERING ASSESSMENTS OF THE RIGHT OF A
FEDERAL OFFICER TO REMOVE A SECTION 459
PROCEEDING UNDER SECTION 1442(a)(1)
Only three federal district courts have addressed the question whether a
section 459 garnishment proceeding can be removed by a federal officer.
Two have held that a federal officer cannot remove the proceeding under
section 1442(a)(1). In denying removal, one court stated that permitting
removal would not only fail to fulfill the purposes of the statute but would
radically alter the relationship between state and federal courts. 133 Another
court concluded that allowing the removal of a section 459 proceeding would
be inconsistent with the theory and purposes of section 1442(a)(1).134
In Wilhelm v. United States Department of Air Force, 35 a wife sought to
satisfy her state court divorce decree, which awarded her one-half of her
husband's retirement pay, by garnishing the United States Air Force, her
husband's former employer. 36 The Air Force petitioned for removal of the
proceeding to federal court, and the wife moved for its remand to state
court.137 In reaching its holding that the Air Force could not remove under
section 1442(a)(1), the court first observed that it would appear that the Air
Force was entitled to remove because it was the named defendant,' 38 but
proceeded to examine carefully the state and federal interests in the
133. Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (S.D.
Tex. 1976) (mem. and order of remand).
134. West v. West, 402 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (mem. and order of
remand).
135. 418 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (mem. and order of remand).
136. Id. at 164.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 165.
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garnishment proceeding. With respect to the state interest, the Wilhelm
court noted that construing section 1442(a)(1) to permit removal of section
459 garnishment proceedings would bring into the federal courts ancillary
domestic relations disputes, which had always been thought to lie within the
exclusive jurisdiction of state courts. 139 Finally, after examining the
discussion of Congressmen Eckhardt and Ullman,14° the court concluded
that Congress had not intended to broaden the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but in fact had envisioned state court implementation of section
459.141 If this conclusion is correct, the state interest in retaining jurisdiction
must be accorded greater weight than the federal interest in removal when
determining the removability of a section 459 proceeding under section
1442(a)(1). It does not follow, however, that federal officer removal is
precluded.
In Wilhelm, the court acknowledged that the purpose of federal officer
removal is to protect federal officers and agencies 142 against state actions
that threaten liability or penalty, and considered whether this federal
interest is implicated in a section 459 garnishment proceeding. It found that
the federal disbursing officer was merely a nominal defendant not subject to
liability, 43 and, in concluding that no federal policy or interest would be
furthered by removing section 459 proceedings to federal court under section
1442(a)(1), 144 expressed the fear that "[a] broader construction of this
provision [section 1442(a)(1)] would effect a profound alteration in the
relationship between state and federal courts."'1 45 The Wilhelm court thus
balanced state and federal interests and concluded both that no federal
interest demanded removal and that strong state interests supported the
denial of removal.
In West v. West, 46 in which several wives garnished the United States
and United States officers and agencies to enforce the support obligations
of their husbands, the court also refused to allow the United State garnish-
ees to remove the section 459 proceedings under section 1442(a)(1). 147 After
noting that the purpose of federal officer removal is to protect federal
139.. Id See generally 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 214 (1960).
140. 418 F. Supp. at 165. The court cited that part of Congressmen Eckhardt's and
Ullman's discussion in which Texas's law of garnishment was raised. See text
accompanying note 132 supra.
141. 418 F. Supp. at 165.
142. Id. The court here implied that an agency can remove under § 1442(a)(1) but
did not discuss whether an agency does indeed come within the language of the
statute. See note 181 infra.
143. 418 F. Supp. at 166. .The court stated: "[T]here is no real collision of interests
of substantial controversy between the plaintiff and this defendant." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The court then concluded by adding that state law will determine what can
be garnished.
146. 402 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (mem. and order of remand).
147. Id. at 1191
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officers against actions that threaten personal liability or penalty, 148 the
court concluded that removal of section 459 proceedings would not further
this purpose, 149 basing its conclusion on two findings: First, that the action
was not against a federal officer; and second, that it neither penalized an
officer for past acts nor attempted to prevent the performance of his official
duties.i 50 The court held that the action was not against an officer because it
did not threaten him with personal liability; its only purpose was to reach
federal monies owed to the defaulting spouse.' 5' Although the West court
failed to explain its finding that the suit was neither an attempt to enjoin
the enforcement of federal law nor based upon acts of an officer, it clearly
stated that no federal interest was involved, holding that the proceeding
could not be removed by a federal officer. Unlike the Wilhelm court, the court
in West did not consider the state interest in section 459 garnishment
proceedings; it simply analyzed section 459 proceedings and found them not
within the intended scope of section 1442(a)(1).
Williams v. Williams,152 the only case which has held appropriate the
removal of section 459 proceedings under section 1442(a)(1), i5 3 also based its
holding solely upon consideration of the nature and extent of the federal
interest involved. In Williams, a wife sought to enforce her alimony award
by naming the United States as garnishee in several writs of attachment
filed in Maryland state court. She attempted, pursuant to section 459, to
reach the pension of her husband, a retired United States warrant officer.
154
The United States successfully petitioned for removal of the proceeding to
federal court, claiming jurisdiction under section 1442(a)(1).155
The Williams opinion began by noting that a garnishment proceeding is
a civil act, 56 a prerequisite to removal under the statute. In determining
148. Id. at 1190-91 (quoting New Jersey v. Moriarity, 268 F. Supp. 546,555 (D. N.J.
1967)).
149. 402 F. Supp. at 1191.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 427 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1976).
153. As discussed at note 8 supra, it is possible that two other courts would allow
removal under § 1442(a)(1).
154. 427 F. Supp. at 558.
155. Id. at 567.
156. 427 F. Supp. at 560 n.8. Perhaps the court first noted this because there is a
dispute among the federal courts concerning whether a garnishment proceeding is a
civil action within the meaning of § 1441. Some courts have distinguished between
garnishment which is found to be inseparably connected with the original judgment
and garnishment which is an independent controversy. The former has been held not
removable, while removal of the latter has been permitted. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
1, at 149-50 n.16 and cases cited therein.
Although the cases cited by the Williams court not only found that a
garnishment proceeding is a civil action, they also held that it could be removed under
§ 1441; to conclude that an action is removable under that section is not to determine
its removability under § 1442(a)(1). Cases discussing the removal of a garnishment
proceeding under § 1441 include Moore v. Sentry Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Miss.
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whether a section 459 proceeding is a civil action that falls within section
1442(a)(1), the court next reviewed Wilhelm and West, the cases denying
removal. 5 7 The disagreement of the Williams court with the result reached
in these two cases is obvious, but difficult to explain. 15 Williams apparently
proceeded from a very broad view of the purposes of federal officer removal;
certainly the manner in which Williams cited North Carolina v. Carr59 and
Willingham'60 supports this view.
In Carr, an FBI agent who, pursuant to an order of the United States
Attorney General, refused to testify when called as a witness in a state court
civil trial was cited for contempt by the state court.' 6' Although the Fourth
Circuit held the case moot, 62 it nevertheless approved removal under section
1442(a)(1), observing that:
Insistence upon the right of removal has been declared essential to the
integrity and preeminence of the Federal government within its realm of
authority.
[T]he central and grave concern of the statute is that a Federal
officer or agent shall not be forced to answer for conduct assertedly
within his duties in any but a Federal forum. Thus the statute looks to
the substance rather than the form of the state proceeding. 63
1975); Swanson v. Sharp, 224 F. Supp. 850 (D. Alas. 1963); Larkin v. Worthley, 114 F.
Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Robinson v. Fort, 112 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Mo. 1953). Contra,
American Auto Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1939); Buford v. Strother, 10
F. 406 (C.C. Iowa 1881).
A garnishment proceeding has, however, been held removable under a federal
officer removal statute. E.g., The Marion, 99 F. 448, 450 (C.C.D.N.J. 1900) (dictum);
Fischer v. Daudisdal, 9 F. 145 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1881) (no opinion) (by implication).
157. 427 F. Supp. at 560-61.
158. Id. at 561. The court cited the part of the West opinion that held that this
garnishment proceeding does not come within the ambit of § 1442(a)(1). See text
accompanying notes 148 to 151 supra. Because the court disagreed with the holding of
West that this proceeding is neither against a federal officer, nor penalizes him for
past acts, nor attempts to enjoin future acts, it can be inferred that the judge found
that a § 459 proceeding is indeed against a federal officer. It can also be inferred that,
in citing the section of the Wilhelm opinion discussed in the text accompanying notes
139 to 141 supra, the court concluded that permitting removal of this proceeding under
§ 1442(a)(1) would not affect the relationship between federal and state courts.
Perhaps it can also be inferred that the court did not believe that a state's interest in
the proceeding sought to be removed should enter into a federal court's determination
of its removability under § 1442(a)(1). Once again, the opinion did not address the
issue.
159. 386 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967).
160. 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
161. 386 F. 2d at 130.
162. Id. at 131. The contempt case was held moot because the suit from which it




Carr was cited in Williams as a case allowing removal. The appropriateness
of removing the contempt proceeding in Carr cannot be disputed. The FBI
agent was threatened with personal liability and penalty for carrying out
his official duties. Thus, the case is a clear example of an attempt by a state
court to interfere with the enforcement of federal policy. The Williams court,
however, did not measure the facts before it with the theoretical yardstick
suggested by Carr. Instead, it chose merely to quote Justice Marshall's
discussion in Willingham of the purpose and evolution of federal officer
removal.
In Willingham, Justice Marshall had emphasized that the basis for
federal jurisdiction of suits against federal officers is the federal interest in
enforcement of federal law by federal officers without interference by the
states. 64 He quoted Tennessee v. Davis16 5 for the proposition that the
purpose of federal officer removal is to protect federal officers - the only
means through which the federal government can act within the states -
from arrest and trial in state courts for acting within the scope of their
federal authority.1
66
Williams quoted this Willingham analysis but interpreted the case very
broadly, stating that "the purpose of section 1442(a)(1) is to enable the
Government to answer in federal rather than in state court for any alleged
failure of action or nonaction in the performance of duties by federal
officers."'167 Willingham had required that the alleged failure of action both
occur in the course of enforcement of federal law and give rise at least to a
colorable defense arising from the duty to enforce federal law.' 68 The
Willingham Court had based its analysis of federal officer removal upon the
premises that "[f]ederal jurisdiction rests on a 'federal interest in the
matter,"' 6 9 and that "the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal
laws through federal officials"' 70 is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under
section 1442(a)(1). In contrast, the Williams opinion failed to articulate the
federal interest that supported removal of the garnishment proceeding
before it, implying merely that uncertainty caused by ambiguities in the
applicable state garnishment law adversely affected the ability of the
federal officers who controlled the dispersal of the garnished monies to
discharge their duties, and that this purported obstacle was sufficient to
warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction.' 7 ' Although the court certified
the ambiguous questions of Maryland law to the Maryland Court of
164. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-08 (1969); notes 102 & 103 supra.
165. 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 263 (1879).
166. 395 U.S. at 406.
167. 427 F. Supp. at 563. The purpose, however, is to enable a federal officer (not
the federal government) to account to a federal court for actions performed in
discharge of official duties and upon which the state court suit is based.
168. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07 (1969).
169. Id. at 406.
170. Id.
171. 427 F. Supp. at 567.
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Appeals, 172 it stated that this certification had no bearing on the right of
removal itself.173 As the court implicitly recognized in its statement that the
decision of the Maryland court would determine "what the United States as
garnishee is or is not required to do,"'1 74 garnishment is an area of state
concern.
175
The Williams opinion closed with an examination of the legislative
history of section 459, finding that Congress, in facilitating the garnishment
of federal funds, had indicated no intention of limiting section 1442(a)(1).1 76
The court concluded that the purpose of removal "is to permit federal
officers, when called upon to perform their official duties in ways different
than they are willing to perform .... to seek determinations in federal
courts," and that this purpose does not conflict with the purposes of the 1974
Social Services Amendments. 177
This view of the purpose of federal officer removal appears overly broad
in several respects. Although the right of removal does protect federal
officers against attempts by state courts to force them to perform their duties
in a manner inconsistent with their federally authorized discretion, it does
so, or should do so, only by way of protection from liability or penalty.178
Moreover, Williams did not discuss one of the primary justifications for
removal: to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in
federal court.' 79 Indeed, the garnishment proceeding sought to be removed
arose precisely because the defense of official immunity had been waived in
172. Id. at 563 n.12. For the resolution of these issues by the Maryland Court of
Appeals, see United States v. Williams, 279 Md. 673, 370 A.2d 1134 (1977).
173. 427 F. Supp. at 564 n.12.
174. Id.
175. Id. The primacy of state law in resolving the garnishment issue is further
illustrated by the government's argument that once the certified issues were settled, it
would only rarely seek removal of such actions in the future. Id. at 563.
176. Id. at 567. Judge Kaufman also quoted at length an interchange between
Congressmen Ullman and Kazen which took place during the course of a debate on
the floor of the House of Representatives, see text accompanying note 132 supra, and
concluded that the discussion, although ambiguous, is not inconsistent with the
removability of a § 459 proceeding under § 1442(a)(1). Id. at 565-66.
177. 427 F. Supp. at 567.
178. In North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967), the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stated that:
The purpose of the statute [1442(a)(1)] is to take from the State courts the
indefeasible power to hold an officer or agent of the United States criminally
or civilly liable for an act allegedly performed in the execution of any of the
powers or responsibilities of the Federal sovereign.
Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
This language was quoted in the Williams opinion, 427 F. Supp. at 561, but
the court nevertheless failed to discuss the liability element of the statute's purpose.
179. The Supreme Court has recently stated that "one of the most important
reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in
a federal court." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). This language was
also quoted by the Williams court, 427 F. Supp. at 563, but it failed to discuss the fact
that no such defense was at issue in the case before it.
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section 459. These elements of the removal doctrine embodied in section
1442(a)(1) are significant in that they qualify and define the availability of
federal officer removal, but the Williams court apparently failed to take
them into account in arriving at its broad formulation of the purposes of
section 1442(a)(1).
In a section 459 garnishment proceeding, the garnishor-spouse merely
seeks to have the United States, through a federal officer, divert federal
monies to a person other than the one for whom they were appropriated; the
officer himself is not subjected to liability. As the Wilhelm court observed,
there is no real "collision of interests" between the garnishor-spouse and the
garnishee-United States.' s° The real party in interest is the defaulting
spouse, for it is his interest in the fund that is being litigated. Moreover, it
can be argued that Williams is inconsistent with even the broadest possible
formulation of the purposes of section 1442(a)(1) because the garnishment
proceeding promotes, rather than inhibits, the federal officer's enforcement
of federal policy. The apparent rationale of Williams is that, in naming the
United States or an officer thereof'8' as garnishee in a state court section
459 proceeding, the garnishor-spouse is in effect enjoining the disbursing
officer's performance of his federal duty to distribute the funds in issue to
the defaulting spouse. This argument is superficially plausible but ignores
the fact that in waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States,
Congress clearly expressed its intention that state court support decrees be
180. Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 166 (S.D. Tex.
1976) (mem. and order of remand).
181. An additional question of construction, not discussed by any of these courts,
arises in the determination of the removability of a § 459 proceeding: does the statute
limit removal to federal officers? Few courts have considered this issue. Compare
Lance Int'l, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (agency
cannot remove); Harlem River Produce Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 F. Supp. 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (agency cannot remove) with James River Apartments, Inc. v. Federal
Hous. Admin., 136 F. Supp. 24 (D. Md. 1955) (dictum) (agency can remove).
Although one court has stated that an agency can remove, the majority view is that
the plain meaning of the statute limits removal to officers. These courts have
maintained that power to expand the scope of § 1442(a)(1) rests with Congress, not the
judiciary. E.g., Lance Int'l, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 F. Supp. 349, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Although the statute repeatedly refers to officers or persons acting under an
officer, see text accompanying note 14 supra, there is a latent ambiguity. The
controlling portion of § 1442(a)(1) arguably can be interpreted to read: (1) an officer of
the United States or an officer of any agency of the United States; or (2) an officer of
the United States or any agency of the United States. A liberal construction of the
statute - resulting in federal agencies having the right of removal - might be
justified in light of Congress' broad purpose of protecting the exercise of all federal
authority. This author recommends, however, that a federal agency be denied the
right of removal until Congress cures this ambiguity in the statute. It should be noted,
however, that this problem can easily be resolved by an agency having its officer seek
removal. See ALI GENERAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION (Tent. Draft No. 4, 6-7,
5 Apr. 1966), in which the American Law Institute recommends that § 1442(a)(1) be




enforced by garnishing federal monies owed the defaulting spouse,1 2 but
held and controlled by federal officers. It is clear that section 459 is itself an
expression of a federal policy that the government pay to the spouses of
federal employees, and spouses of others to whom federal monies are due,
the amounts owed to such spouses by virtue of state court support
decrees. 113
In construing the reach of section 1442(a)(1), the Williams court did not
consider the interests of the state in retaining jurisdiction of the garnish-
ment proceeding. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly balanced
federal interests against those of the states in cases involving federal officer
removal statutes, it has repeatedly emphasized in such cases that officer
removal statutes are to be construed with a high regard for a state's interest
in enforcing its own law. The state interests in section 459 proceedings are
substantial: state law governs garnishment; the proceeding is ancillary to a
state court decree; and the consequences of nonsupport burden state
governments. Moreover, there appears to be no federal interest of the nature
required for federal officer removal. The proceeding does not penalize a
federal officer or the federal government for enforcing federal law, and no
colorable defense, particularly no defense of official immunity, would seem
to be available to federal officers involved in a section 459 garnishment
proceeding. The only instance in which removal might be warranted is when
the federal government or its officer is subsequently sued by the defaulting
spouse for allegedly having improperly diverted the funds.
A weak argument for removal might be premised on a federal interest in
protecting the United States against double liability arising out of
garnishment proceedings. The critical issue in evaluating this argument is
the probability of double payment. The possibility of double payment would
seem to arise only when a state court's garnishment judgment is not
recognized by another court. Such a denial of full faith and credit could
occur only upon a finding by the second court both that the first court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the primary debtor (the spouse to whom the
United States owed the monies), and that the jurisdiction issue was neither
litigated nor capable of being litigaged in the first forum. Until the Supreme
Court's decision Shaffer v. Heitner,18 4 a state court could exercise in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction without first finding minimal contacts between the
defendant, the cause of action, and the forum state. Prior to Shaffer, it was
sufficient for purposes of exercising jurisdiction over a garnishment
proceeding that the garnishee was present in the state. In addition, the
garnishee was protected against double liability if he had notified the
primary debtor of the suit.185 In Shaffer the Supreme Court extended the
requisites for personal jurisdiction to quasi in rem and, arguably, in rem
182. See notes 129 & 130 supra.
183. See note 129 supra.
184. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
185. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 227 (1905).
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proceedings.8 6 Thus, for a state court properly to exercise jurisdiction in a
section 459 garnishment proceeding, it must find that the defaulting spouse
had minimal contacts with the state. Double liability of the United States
would arise only when a state court either refused to follow Shaffer and
assumed jurisdiction of a section 459 proceeding without analyzing the
relationship between the defendant-spouse and the state, or did not
adjudicate the question of jurisdiction.
It must be noted, however, that Williams was decided prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer. The state court involved in Williams
did not have to find that it had personal jurisdiction over the defaulting
spouse; the consent of the United States to suit and the presence of the
garnishee within the forum were sufficient for purposes of jurisdiction. Thus,
although the possibility of double payment might justify federal officer
removal after Shaffer, it could not have supported the Williams court's
allowing removal because double payment was not even theoretically
possible at that time. In any event, it appears that the possibility of double
liability is too remote to justify the removal of section 459 proceedings to
federal court. It is reasonable to assume that state courts will follow Shaffer
and that denial of full faith and credit, with ensuing double liability for the
United States, is therefore unlikely to occur. Moreover, the restriction of
removal to cases which involve the actual liability of a federal officer or the
federal government appears to be more consonant with the traditional
purposes of federal officer removal.
CONCLUSION
Both the historical development of federal officer removal and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of its purposes confirm that this right is
designed to enable a federal officer to perform his official duties with the
knowledge that if his acts are later claimed to violate state law, a federal
forum will be available to entertain any colorable defense which arises from
his duty to enforce federal law. A section 459 proceeding does not threaten a
federal officer with personal liability, is not based upon his performance of
his official duties, and does not enable the officer to present a defense based
upon his enforcement of federal law to a federal court. Granting removal of
section 459 proceedings neither protects a federal officer nor preserves the
supremacy of federal law. It does, however, invade the traditionally
exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts over garnishment proceedings. No
federal interest warrants removal of these proceedings under section
1442(a)(1), and substantial state interests, in addition to the principle of
comity in the federal system, suggest that section 459 garnishment
proceedings should not be removable.
186. 433 U.S. at 207. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 24, (3d ed. 1977);
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 155 (1977).
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